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INTRODUCTION

According to Greek legend, Paris, a prince of Troy, visited the Greek city
of Sparta, where he fell in love with Helen, the wife of Menelaus, the King of
Sparta. Paris abducted Helen. In an effort to reclaim her, the Greeks
assembled about 100,000 warriors and sent a vast fleet to attack Troy, giving
rise to the Trojan War. After an unsuccessful ten-year siege, a famous ruse
eventually ended the conflict. Before seemingly sailing away, the Greeks built
a huge wooden horse and left it outside the gates to the city of Troy as a "gift."
Unknown to the Trojans, the Greeks had hidden several soldiers in the horse.
After demolishing a wall to the city, the Trojans dragged the horse into Troy.
At night, the hidden Greek soldiers emerged from the horse and opened the
gates to the city, allowing the returning Greek army to capture and bum the
city.' Over the years, the term "Trojan horse" has come to refer to "gifts" or
other factors likely to undermine an established institution.2
In response to the financial scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and other
publicly traded companies that beleaguered our nation's economy and
securities markets in the early 2000s, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOx). 3 Specifically denominated as "[a]n Act [t]o protect
investors,"4 SOx sought to restore investor confidence and to rebuild integrity
in the auditing profession. In particular, SOx enacted several reforms
designed to enhance auditor independence. Among other provisions, SOx

1. See 27 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 134 (int'l ed. 1999).
2. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2451 (unabr. ed. 1986).
Other dictionaries capitalize the first letter, and this article follows that convention. See, e.g.,
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1264 (1984).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at scattered sections of 15, 18,
28 & 29 U.S.C.).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, pmbl., 116 Stat. at 745.
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requires a public company's audit committee to preapprove all audit and nonaudit services and specifically bars auditors' from providing certain services
to publicly traded audit clients. 6 Although Congress considered a complete
prohibition that would have prevented auditing firms from providing any nonaudit services, including so-called "tax services," 7 to audit clients, Congress
ultimately decided both against an absolute bar on non-audit services and to
omit tax services from the list of prohibited services. As a result, as long as
the audit committee preapproves the engagement, SOx generally allows an
auditor to provide tax services to an audit client.8 Knowledgeable observers
might note that the accounting industry spent $41 million on lobbying
activities between 1997 and 2001, mention that each of the then Big Five
accounting firms ranked among the top twenty contributors to George W.
Bush's 2000 presidential campaign, and point out that those firms contributed
to 212 of the 248 Senate and House members who served on Congressional
committees involved in the numerous investigations that began after the recent
financial scandals.9 Interestingly, even The Wall Street Journalhas reported
that the auditing industry "successfully lobbied Congress to specifically
sanction the offering of traditional tax-planning services and tax advice--one
of the largest and most lucrative nonaudit services provided by accounting
firms."' 0

5. SOx uses the term "public accounting firm" to refer to a proprietorship, partnership,
or other legal entity engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit
reports. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)( I ) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (a)( 11)). In addition,
most prohibitions in SOx also apply to any person associated with a public accounting firm.
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j- 1(g)). This article uses
the term "auditor" to refer to both accounting firms that audit public companies and individual
auditors and other professionals at those firms.
6. One important caveat to this discussion: SOx and the federal securities laws
generally do not apply to closely held companies and not-for-profit organizations that may
require audited financial statements to obtain bank loans or for other reasons. Those enterprises
and their auditors remain beyond the SEC's reach. See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J.
BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 171 (3d ed. 2001).
7. As an umbrella term, a reference to "tax services" covers a broad range of services,
ranging from tax compliance work, such as preparing tax returns, to sophisticated tax
minimization strategies, or "tax shelters," that aggressively seek to use quirks in the Internal
Revenue Code to avoid taxes. See Sheryl Stratton, Could Enron CollapseLead to Big 5 Losing
Tax Work?, 94 TAx NOTES 812 (2002); see also infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
9. See James D. Cox, Reforming the CultureofFinancialReporting:The PCAOB and
the Metricsfor Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 316 (2003).
10. Michael Schroeder, SEC ClearsRules LimitingAuditorsfrom Offering Consulting
Services, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at C9.
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SOx also authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to
promulgate additional regulations and rules to implement statutory provisions
and to strengthen existing administrative requirements or professional
standards regarding auditor independence." As a result, even after SOx's
enactment, considerable debate has continued as to whether an auditor's
provision of tax services to an audit client impairs the auditor's
independence.' 2 While the release that accompanied the SEC's proposed rules
to implement SOx's reforms to strengthen auditor independence raised the
possibility that the SEC might ban certain tax services involving so-called "tax
shelters,"' 3 the SEC ultimately concluded that the difficulty in defining a tax
shelter counseled against a blanket prohibition. 4 More significantly, the
subsequent release that announced the SEC' s final rules specifically reiterated
the agency's "long-standing position that an accounting firm can provide tax
services to its audit clients without impairing the firm's independence."' 5
As the most vocal advocate in the legal academy for increased auditor
independence, Professor Bernard Wolfman has repeatedly argued that a
conflict of interest arises anytime an auditor offers significant tax advice to an
audit client or promotes a tax shelter to anyone. 6 Accordingly, he has urged

11. SOx established the PCAOB to register, regulate, and inspect public accounting
firms that audit publicly traded companies, which the legislation refers to as "issuers" or
"registrants"; to establish or adopt auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other
standards; and to conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings when appropriate to
enforce compliance with the law and professional standards. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211). Perhaps most significantly, SOx ended accountant selfregulation.
12. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6016 (Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Final Rules].
13. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,780, 76,790 (Dec. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. See
supra note 7 for more explanation about "tax shelters."
14. See Schroeder, supra note 10.
15. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
16. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, The Best Way to Protect Auditor Independence, 89
TAx NOTES 1779 (2000) [hereinafter Wolfman, The Best Way] (arguing that any tax advice that
an auditor provides to any client may impair the auditor's independence); Bernard Wolfman,
Auditors:Stickto YourAuditing, 96TAXNOTES 298 (2002) [hereinafter Wolfman, Stickto Your
Auditing] (urging the Senate to pass legislation that would include tax advice among the nonaudit expert services that auditors may not provide to audit clients); Bernard Wolfrnan,
Wolfman's SECAuditor Independence Rules Comments, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003,
availableon LEXIS at 2003 TNT 15-63 [hereinafter Wolfman, Auditor Independence Rules]
(recommending that the SEC prohibit an auditor from performing "all tax services other than
return preparation and compliance work"); Bernard Wolfman, SEC Let Investors Down, 98 TAx
NOTES 1019 (2003) [hereinafter Wolfnan, SECLet InvestorsDown] (opining that the SEC "has
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the SEC and Congress to prohibit auditors for public companies from
promoting tax shelters or providing tax planning and consulting services. 7
Going beyond Professor Wolfman's recommendations, this article asserts that
auditors for public companies should also not provide tax compliance services
to audit clients or their executives. Accordingly, this article argues that SOx's
failure to prohibit auditors for public companies" from both providing tax
services to audit clients or their executives and selling tax shelters to anyone
presents a Trojan horse that threatens both the investing public and the
auditing profession.
To the extent that conflicts of interest cause audit failures, SOx leaves
an important gap in its reforms to enhance auditor independence by failing to
prohibit such activities. Moreover, the attempts to increase auditor
independence do not adequately address unconscious bias, the propensity to
interpret data in accordance with one's desires, 9 and a tendency that legal
scholars often refer to as cognitive bias.0 As long as financial or other
incentives tempt auditing firms and their executives and employees to try to
retain or obtain engagements with audit clients, whether those engagements
involve tax services, other permissible non-audit services, or future audit
services, either this unconscious bias or the conflicts of interest arising from
tax engagements could lead to future audit failures."' In particular, these
financial and other incentives can potentially influence an auditor's decision
to acquiesce in a questionable accounting practice. While management can
no longer hire or fire the auditor, under the guise of increasing auditor
independence, management can use "enhanced independence" to support a
recommendation to the audit committee to hire another firm to provide tax

left the investing public in the lurch").
17. Wolfman, AuditorIndependenceRules, supranote 16; Wolfrnan, SECLetInvestors
Down, supra note 16.
18. By limiting this proposal to public companies, this proposal seeks to avoid adverse
effects on small businesses. Many small businesses and their owners or creditors, however, may
conclude that enterprise should not retain the same firm to provide both auditing and tax
services. See Stratton, supra note 7.
19. See Max H. Bazerman et al., Why GoodAccountants Do Bad Audits, HARv. Bus.
REv., Nov. 2002, at 96.
20. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing
Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CoRp. L. (forthcoming summer 2004) (describing cognitive bias
and arguing that regulators have not attempted to understand how these biases affect gatekeepers
or how regulation can best account for such biases).
21. Unconscious bias also suggests the potential need to require mandatory rotation of
audit firms after fixed terms for predetermined fees to minimize the threat that a public company
can fire or otherwise punish the auditor for failing to approve questionable accounting practices.
See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 102. This article, however, will not address mandatory
audit firm rotation.
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services, other permissible non-audit services, or future audit services. Thus,
if the auditor does not approve, or at least acquiesce in, certain accounting
treatments or disclosures that management prefers, the auditor conceivably
jeopardizes potentially significant future professional fees.22
Part I of this article discusses the provisions in SOx that enhance auditor
independence. Part I examines the SEC's rulemaking efforts to implement
those reforms and several subsequent developments. Part III explains why
conflicts of interest and unconscious bias remain problems in a post-SOx
world. Part IV presents and evaluates various arguments regarding whether
or not auditors should provide any tax services. Ideally, auditors for public
companies should simply stick to auditing. Ultimately, this section concludes
that such auditors should neither provide tax services to audit clients or their
executives nor promote tax shelters to anyone. When an audit client
purchases a tax shelter that materially affects its tax expense and liabilities
from its auditor, the accounting firm must audit its own advice, which impairs
its independence. Because accounting firms tend to sell similar tax-shelters,
even the attempt to sell a similar tax shelter to a non-audit client also impairs
auditor independence. When officers of audit clients purchase such tax
shelters, the accounting firm arguably must perform incompatible roles-the
audit requires the accounting firm to act as a watchdog of management at the
same time that the firm must act as an advocate for the officer in the tax
matter. In any situation in which the auditor expresses an opinion on a tax
matter, the auditor must review its own work. Even routine tax compliance
work often requires the auditor to assume an advocacy role for the client. In
an effort to avoid such possibilities, an auditor should not offer any tax
services to an audit client.
Accordingly, Part IV urges individual auditors, auditing firms, the
auditing profession, audit committees, directors, investors (especially
institutional investors), the PCAOB, and the SEC to take any necessary
actions to prevent conflicts of interest and the desire to retain or obtain tax
engagements from further damaging the auditing profession's integrity, the
public's confidence in the capital markets in this country, and the U.S.
economy generally. If individual auditors, auditing firms, audit committees,
boards of directors, and investors do not respond to this continuing threat to
auditor independence, this article recommends that the PCAOB and the SEC
adopt and approve regulations that treat both performing tax services for audit
clients or their executives and offering or promoting tax shelters as
impermissible activities for registered public accounting firms. Without
vigilance from all involved, SOx's auditor independence provisions create a

22.

See generally HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 173-74, 192-93.
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Trojan horse that threatens both the auditing profession and the investing
public.
I. REFORMS IN SARBANES-OXLEY REGARDING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE

Even though SOx enacted numerous reforms in an effort to protect
investors, the legislative history explicitly states that the provisions regarding
auditor independence stand "at the center of this legislation."2 3 Since the
1930s, the federal securities laws have required an independent public
accountant to attest to financial statements filed with the SEC.24 In fact, the
belief in the auditor's independence from the audit client has historically
provided thejustification for the investing public's confidence in the integrity
of financial statements that public companies must file.25 Therefore, while the
federal securities laws grant a franchise to independent auditors,26 important
responsibilities accompany that franchise. In United States v. Arthur Young
& Co.," an unanimous Supreme Court recognized that:
[Tihe independent auditor assumes a public responsibility... [The auditor] owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the
investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity
28
to the public trust.

Based on SEC statistics, the Senate Report that accompanied the bill that
eventually became SOx observed that the percentage of average revenue at the
then Big Five29 accounting firms arising from accounting and auditing services
fell from fifty-five percent in 1988 to thirty-one percent in 1999.30 By
comparison, the percentage of average revenue coming from management
consulting services increased from twenty-two percent to fifty percent during
that same period. 3' The most recent data that the SEC reported to Congress

23. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, sch. A(25), 15 U.S.C. § 77(aa)(25) (2000);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (2000).
25. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14 (2002).
26. Significantly, federal law does not require an issuer to employ a law firm, an
underwriter, or any other type of professional. See id. (citing testimony from Richard Breeden,
a former SEC Chairman).
27. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
28. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
29. After its conviction on one felony count of obstructing justice, Arthur Andersen
LLP (Andersen) voluntarily stopped auditing public companies, leaving four major accounting
and professional services firms (collectively, the "Big Four" or the "Final Four").
30. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14 (2002).
31. See id. at 14-15.
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showed that, on average, non-audit fees comprised seventy-three percent of
the total fees of public accounting firms.32 In other words, public accounting
firms charged $2.69 in non-audit fees for every $1.00 in audit fees. 3 In
essence, auditing had become a "loss leader" to more profitable consulting
services.3 4 Because more than one hundred million investors in the United
States rely on audited financial statements to reach investment decisions,
Congress enacted measures that sought to ensure that accounting firms
auditing public companies maintain their independence from their audit clients
and uphold the public trust.35
In an effort to reduce conflicts of interest, 36 SOx contains at least six
different provisions designed to strengthen various requirements regarding
auditor independence for public companies. 7 These provisions affect audit
committees, prohibited services, pre-approval requirements, audit partner
rotation, conflicts of interest, and implementing regulations.38 In addition,
SOx directed the Comptroller General to study the potential effects arising
from requiring mandatory audit firm rotation.39
32. See id. at 15.
33. See id.
34. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1410-12 (2002).
35. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 14, 19 (2002).
36. Even after SOx, an arguably inherent conflict of interest remains because the issuer
undergoing the audit must pay the audit fee. See id. at 14.
37. The legislation specifically instructs appropriate State regulatory authorities to
determine independently the proper standards that should apply to small and medium-sized
accounting firms that do not register with the PCAOB. SOx explicitly provides that State
regulatory authorities should not presume that the standards applicable to registered public
accounting firms also apply to firms that do not audit issuers. The Act urges State regulators
to consider the size and the nature of the accounting firms they supervise and the size and nature
of those firms' clients. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 209, 116 Stat.
745, 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7234).
38. See infra notes 40-46 and 48-60 and accompanying text.
39. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 207 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232). In addition,
SOx directed the Comptroller General to submit a report to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services about the potential
effects of requiring the mandatory rotation of auditing firms not later than one year after the
legislation's enactment. See id. GAO subsequently submitted a report summarizing an
extensive survey directed to the chief financial officers at more than 1,150 public companies,
the audit committees at those companies, and more than 600 auditing firms. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: REQUIRED STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL
EFFECTS OF MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION, GAO-04-216, at 3, 4, 8 (2003), availableat

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04216.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (concluding that costs
from increased audit fees and the loss of institutional knowledge acquired by a public
company's previous auditor under mandatory audit firm rotation likely outweigh any benefits
from enhanced auditor independence).
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Although outside the title in SOx captioned "Auditor Independence,"4
perhaps most significantly, the legislation directed the SEC to prescribe rules
that prohibit the national securities exchanges and national securities
associations from listing any issuer that does not satisfy certain standards
relating to audit committees.4 1 Once effective, the new listing standards will
require those public companies that list their shares on national securities
exchanges and associations, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq), to give their audit committees
direct responsibility to hire, compensate, oversee, and fire the independent
auditor. 2 In addition, the new listing standards will only allow independent
directors to serve on audit committees.43 To qualify as independent, a board
member generally cannot accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer." In a further effort to empower audit
committees, another SOx provision requires a registered accounting firm
performing an audit for a public company to report timely to the company's
audit committee about the critical accounting policies and practices affecting
the company's financial statements; all alternative treatments within generally
accepted accounting principles that the auditor has discussed with
management; any accounting disagreements between management and the
auditor; and any other material written communications between the auditor
and management.45

40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, tit. II (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a), 78j-1).
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)). The term
"audit committee" refers to a committee of a public company's board of directors that oversees
both the accounting and financial reporting processes and the audits of the company's financial
statements. If a public company has not created such a committee, the term refers to the entire
board of directors. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (a)(3)).
42. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)). The SEC
issued final rules on April 9, 2003 and then approved listing standards pursuant to those rules
on November 4, 2003. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed.
Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003); Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes
(SR-NYSE-2002-33 and SR-NASD-2002-141), 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter NYSE and NASD Rulemaking Relating to Corporate Governance]. See infra notes
82-85 and accompanying text.
43. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1). SOx also
mandates that the standards require listed companies to establish procedures for their audit
committees to handle complaints about accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters; to authorize the audit committee to retain independent counsel and other advisors; and
to provide appropriate funding to pay for the independent audit and to compensate any advisors.
See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. § 204 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(k)).
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Second, SOx prohibits auditors from providing certain services to audit
clients subject to the SEC's jurisdiction." The legislative history states that
three basic principles informed the list of prohibited activities that Congress
established for registered public accounting firms that audit public companies.
To qualify as independent, an auditingfirm: (1) should not audit its own
work; (2) should not function as part of client management or as a client
employee; and (3) should not act as an advocatefor the audit client.47 The
"prohibited activities" for auditors include bookkeeping or other services
related to the audit client's accounting records or financial statements;
financial information systems design and implementation; appraisal or
valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial
services; internal audit outsourcing services, management functions, or human
resources; legal and expert services unrelated to the audit; and any other
service that the PCAOB decides to prohibit via regulation." Subject to the
SEC's approval, the last category explicitly gives the PCAOB the authority to
add "prohibited activities" to the list.49 If a registered public accounting firm
provides any of the listed services to an audit client who is also an issuer, the
audit firm likely would not only jeopardize its independence from the audit
client, but also violate federal securities laws, SEC regulations, and PCAOB
rules.5" As described more fully below, an auditor may perform services not
included on the prohibited list, including tax services, for an audit client only
if the client's audit committee approves those services in advance."
Third, SOx generally requires an issuer's audit committee to preapprove
all services, both audit and non-audit, that a registered public accounting firm
provides to an audit client. 2 This requirement specifically applies to any nonprohibited services. The statute allows the audit committee to delegate the
authority to grant pre-approvals to one or more designated members, as long
as any designee also qualifies as an independent director and any resulting
approvals come before full audit committee at each of its scheduled

46. See id. § 201 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7231).
47. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 18 (2002).
48. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-l(g), 7231).
On a case by case basis and subject to the SEC's review, the PCAOB may exempt any person,
issuer, public accounting firm, or transaction from these prohibitions to the extent necessary to
protect investors and to advance the public interest. See id. § 201(b) (to be codified at 15

U.S.C. § 7231).
49. See id. § 107(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)).
50. See id. SOx, however, does give the PCAOB the authority to grant exemptions on
a case by case basis. See supra note 48.
51. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
52. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7231).
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meetings.5 3 In addition, the statute allows a de minimis54 exception to the preapproval requirement when an auditor provides services which the issuer did
not recognize at the time of the engagement as non-audit services, and the
aggregate amount of all such non-audit services that the auditor provided to
the issuer did not exceed five percent of the total amount that the issuer paid
to its auditor during the fiscal year in which the auditor provided the non-audit
services." After either the issuer or the auditor promptly brings such services
to the audit committee's attention, the audit committee can approve these
services before the auditor completes the audit.5 6 Once again, if the audit
committee delegates such approval authority to one or more of its members,
those members may grant the approval necessary for the de minimis
exception.5 7 In addition to satisfying the pre-approval requirement, issuers
must disclose the amounts paid to auditors for various types of services.5 "
Fourth, SOx codifies previous auditing standards that required audit
partner rotation. Under the new statutory provisions, a registered public
accounting firm must rotate the lead partner and the review partner on any
audits of public companies so that no partner performs an audit on the same
issuer as a lead partner or review partner for more than five consecutive years.
In other words, SOx provides that most accounting firms may not provide
audit services to an issuer if the lead audit partner or the reviewing audit
partner has performed audit services for the issuer in each of the issuer's
previous five fiscal years.5 9
Fifth, in an effort to eliminate certain conflicts of interest, SOx imposes
a "cooling-off period" that effectively prevents public companies from hiring
members of the audit team in certain high-level positions, including chief
executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer,
and equivalent positions. As a result, SOx prevents an auditing firm from
auditing an issuer that employs, in certain high-level positions, an individual
who worked on the issuer's audit during the one year period before the audit
services begin.6"

53. See id. § 202 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(3)).
54. SOx incorrectly spells the word "de minimus." Id. § 202 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-l(i)(1)(B)).

55.

See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(i)(l)(B)(i)).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(i)(l)(B)).
See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(i)(3)); see also supra note 54.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(2)).
See id. § 203 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j)).
See id. § 206 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1()).
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II. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
In response to the directives in SOx, the SEC issued final regulations
regarding auditor independence, minimum listing standards related to audit
committees, and improper influence on the conduct of audits. In addition,
several recent revelations concerning situations where auditors provided tax
services to audit clients or client management have further tarnished the
accounting profession's reputation and raised additional concerns about
auditor independence when auditors provide tax services to audit clients or
their executives or promote tax shelters.
A. Regulatory Actions
Pursuant to the directive in SOx to the SEC to issue final regulations to
strengthen auditor independence within 180 days after enactment, 6' the SEC
timely issued final regulations on January 28, 2003.62 Initially, these
regulations, which generally became effective on May 6, 2003,63 amended the
Code of Federal Regulations to reflect SOx's new rules on prohibited
services .6' The same three principles that informed the list of prohibited
activities that Congress established for auditors in SOx essentially provide the
predicate for the SEC's final rules. 65 After the release accompanying the rules
that the SEC originally proposed suggested that audit committees keep in
mind these basic principles in determining whether to allow the auditor to
provide tax services, 66 several commentators observed that such a
recommendation "would significantly alter the Commission's historic position
related to tax services. '67 Even though the release accompanying the SEC's
final rules did not specifically address this observation on the merits, the SEC
did reiterate its "long-standing position that an accounting firm can provide
tax services to its audit clients without impairing the firm's independence. 68

61. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §208(a), 116 Stat. 745,775
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7233).
62. See Final Rules, supra note 12. About two months later, in March 2003, the SEC
issued technical corrections to these rules. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,354 (Mar. 31, 2003).
63. See Final Rules, supra note 12. The regulations, however, contain various
transitional rules. See id. at 6006, 6047 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(e) (2003)).
64. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
65. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6010; see also supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
66. See Proposed Rules, supra note 13, at 76,790.
67. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
68.

Id.
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The SEC reasoned that SOx expressly states that auditors may provide certain
non-audit services to audit clients "including tax services . . . only if the
activity is approved in advance by the audit committee."69'
Although neither SOx nor the SEC's final rules on auditor independence
explicitly define "tax services," the release accompanying the SEC's final
rules specifically mentioned "tax compliance, tax planning, and tax advice"
as permissible non-audit services, assuming that the audit committee has
preapproved such services.7" The SEC's release, however, cautioned that
simply labeling a service as a tax service does not automatically eliminate the
potential to impair independence. In that vein, the SEC warned both audit
committees and accountants that certain tax services could or would impair an
auditor's independence. In particular, the SEC's release unequivocally stated
that "representing an audit client before a tax court, district court, or federal
court of claims" would impair independence. 7 In addition, the SEC's release
encouraged audit committees to scrutinize carefully any engagement in which
the auditor recommends a transaction where "the sole business purpose of
which may be tax avoidance and the tax treatment of which may be not
supported in the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations."72 In essence,
both the registered public accounting firm and the audit committee should
consider whether the proposed service qualifies as an allowable tax service or
an impermissible "legal service" or "expert service."73 Once again, however,

69. Id. at 6017 n.103 (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(h) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
78j-l(h)).
70. Id. at 6017. In addition, the SEC's final rules specifically list fees billed for
professional services for "tax compliance, tax planning, and tax advice" under the caption "Tax
Fees." Id.; see also infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
71. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
72.

Id.

73. The prohibition against "legal services" precludes an auditor from providing any
service that only someone licensed, admitted, or otherwise qualified to practice law may provide
in thatjurisdiction. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (c)(4)(ix) (2003); see also Final Rules, supra note
12, at 6015. By comparison, the provision restricting "expert services unrelated to the audit"
only applies to expert opinions or other expert services for an audit client or an audit client's
legal representative if the auditor advocates the audit client's interest in litigation or in a
regulatory or administrative proceeding or investigation. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (c)(4)(x);
see also Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6015-16. The release accompanying the Final Rules
specifically notes that the prohibition against expert services "does not apply to other permitted
non-audit services, such as tax services." Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6016 n.97. Although
almost all services that an accountant provides would arguably qualify as "expert services," the
ban applies only to services that involve advocacy. As a result, the final regulation allows an
auditor to provide factual accounts or testimony about work performed and to explain any
positions taken or conclusions reached in any engagement for the audit client. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01 (c)(4)(x); see also Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6016.
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recall that the SEC's rules do not apply to non-audit services that an auditing
firm provides to a non-audit client.7 4
To enable investors to evaluate the auditor's independence, the final
rules also expanded previously required disclosures regarding fees paid to the
auditor for both audit and non-audit services to cover four distinct categories:
75
"Audit Fees," "Audit-Related Fees," "Tax Fees," and "All Other Fees."
Under the caption "Tax Fees," a public company must disclose the aggregate
amount that the auditor billed for professional services for "tax compliance,
tax advice, and tax planning" in each of the last two fiscal years. 76 In addition,
public companies must describe the nature of the services that gave rise to
such fees and the amount of fees paid to the auditing firm for tax services.77
The SEC's new regulations on auditor independence also addressed
compensation policies, conflicts of interest, and partner rotation. Going
beyond the statutory language, the regulations specify that the receipt of
compensation by an "audit partner" based upon procuring engagements with
the audit client for services other than audit, review, and attest services
destroys independence.78 The SEC rules also require a one-year "cooling off'
period prior to the commencement of audit procedures if certain members of
an audit client's senior management have served as members of the audit
team.79 Finally, the rules generally require the rotation of the lead and
concurring partners on an audit team every five years.80
As noted, SOx directed the SEC to prescribe rules requiring the national
securities exchanges and national securities associations to adopt new listing
standards regarding audit committees that comply with the audit committee
requirements that SOx mandated.8 In April 2003, the SEC issued rules that
required each national securities exchange and national securities association

74. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6010.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (Item 9(e)(l)). Previous proxy disclosure rules required
public companies to disclose the professional fees paid to the auditor for both audit and nonaudit services during the most recent fiscal year in three categories, namely "Audit Fees,"
"Financial Systems Design and Implementation Fees," and "All Other Fees." Final Rules, supra
note 12, at 6030 n.226.
76. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-101 (Item 9(e)(3)); see also Final Rules, supranote
12, at 6030, 6048.
77. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (Item 9(e)(3)); see also Final Rules, supranote
12, at 6030, 6048.
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(8); see also Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6024-26,
6047.
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(2)(iii); see also Final Rules, supra note 12, at
6007-10,6044-45.
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(6); see also Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017-22,
6047.
81. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
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to submit proposed amendments to their listing standards that comply with
Exchange Act Rule 10A-3 by July 15, 2003.2 In addition, the rules set
December 1,2003 as the deadline to obtain final approval.8 3 Under the SEC's
rules, most domestic companies must comply with the new listing rules by the
earlier of (1) their first annual shareholders meeting after January 15, 2004,
or (2) October 31, 2004.4 On November 4,2003, the SEC approved amended
proposals from both the NYSE and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., through its subsidiary, Nasdaq. 5
In May 2003, the SEC promulgated a final rule, effective June 27, 2003,
to implement another provision in SOx 6 that directed the SEC to prescribe
rules or regulations to prohibit any officer or director of an issuer, or any other
person acting under the direction of an officer or director, from taking any
action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence the issuer's
independent auditor for the purpose of rendering the financial statements
materially misleading.87 Among other things, the final rule prohibits various
actions toward an independent auditor by any person acting under the
direction of an officer or director if that person "knew or should have known
that such action, if successful, could result in rendering the issuer's financial
statements materially misleading."8 8 Such conduct might include offering or
paying bribes or other financial incentives, such as offering future
employment or contracts for non-audit services; threatening to cancel or
canceling existing non-audit or audit engagements if the auditor objects to the
issuer's accounting; and seeking to have a partner removed from the audit
engagement because the partner objects to the issuer's accounting. 9
B. Other Developments
Enron's sudden collapse and the other recent financial scandals have
seriously damaged the auditing profession's perceived independence and

82. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788
(Apr. 16, 2003).
83. See id. at 18,788, 18,817.
84. Id. at 18,788.
85. See NYSE and NASD Rulemaking Relating to Corporate Governance, supra note
42.
86. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242).
87. See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820 (May 28,2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b) (2003)).
88. Id. at 31,830 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(l)).
89. See id. at 31,823.
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reputation.90 Even after SOx's enactment, however, three more revelations
have raised further questions about tax services and auditor independence. In
early February 2003, The Wall Street Journal reported that Sprint Corp.
(Sprint) ousted its two top executives because they purchased tax shelters that
the company's auditor, Ernst & Young LLP (Ernst & Young), had marketed
so that they could each avoid paying taxes on more than $100 million in gains
from exercising stock options beginning in 1999. 9' When the IRS challenged
the strategies, the executives faced tax bills that they could not afford to pay
because their Sprint shares had plummeted in value.
Later that month, the Joint Committee on Taxation issued a 2,700-page
report that concluded that Enron Corp. deliberately and repeatedly entered into
complex transactions structured solely to obtain favorable tax and financial
accounting treatments. 92 These transactions enabled Enron's tax department
to become a "profit center," generating more than $2 billion in tax and
financial accounting benefits. 93 In a dozen specifically described transactions,
Enron obtained advice from various promoters and advisors, including its
auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). 94 Andersen both promoted and
provided the primary tax opinion letter in two transactions. 95 Other Big Four
auditing firms or an affiliate assisted prominently in three other transactions.96
More recently, in January 2004, former U.S. Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh, the examiner in the bankruptcy case involving WorldCom, Inc.,
issued a 542-page report that described as "'highly aggressive"' a tax strategy
that the company's current auditor, KPMG LLP (KPMG), recommended to

90. See Lingling Wei, Enron CollapseLets Academics Discuss Ethics, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 13, 2002, at B9 (citing areport from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
that enrollment in accounting programs had dropped twenty-five percent in the previous four
years). In early November 2003, a subsidiary of Charles Schwab Corp. released a survey that
found that sixty-five percent of those polled do not trust independent auditors, up from fiftyeight percent in 2002. See Lynn Cowan, Rich See More Risk Everywhere, but Stocks Offer
Some Solace, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2003, at D3 (stating that the U.S. Trust Co. conducted the
survey via telephone from mid-September to mid-October 2003).
91. See Rebecca Blumenstein et al., Sprint Forced Out Top Executives over
Questionable Tax Shelter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2003, at Al; Rebecca Blumenstein & Carol
Hymowitz, Inside the Tough Call at Sprint: FireAuditoror Top Executives?, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2003, at Al.

92. See STAFFOF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OFENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES,
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/
joint/jcs-3-03/voll/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
93. See id. at 8-9.
94. See id. at 8, 10, 16.
95. See id. at 10.
96. See id.

Summer]

"Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse

479

the company in an effort to avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in state
income taxes.97 Although Andersen audited WorldCom before its bankruptcy,
the company hired KPMG as its auditor after Andersen's collapse. 9
Subsequently, Massachusetts and thirteen other states filed motions seeking
to disqualify KPMG as the company's auditor and to disgorge all fees paid to
the firm, arguing that as auditor KPMG would need to evaluate its own
previous tax advice.99
Collectively, these developments refocused attention on the conflicts of
interest that can arise when an auditor markets a tax shelter to an audit client
or its executives, whether or not the IRS actually questions the transaction.100
In the aftermath of these developments, the publicity accompanying the more
recent travel billing scandal involving PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
(Pricewaterhouse), Ernst & Young, and KPMG has further tarnished the
accounting industry's reputation.'0 ' These firms, and perhaps Deloitte &
Touche LLP (Deloitte & Touche), allegedly obtained hundreds of millions of
dollars in rebates on airline tickets and other travel costs incurred on client
business over a ten-year period beginning in 1991, but did not pass the savings
along to their clients, including the federal government.0 2 In December 2003,
Pricewaterhouse agreed to a settlement valued at $54.5 million to resolve a
class action lawsuit filed in a Texarkana, Arkansas state court.10 3

97. Dennis K. Berman et al., MCI Examiner CriticizesKPMG on Tax Strategy, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at A3 (quoting examiner's report by Richard Thornburgh on
MCI/WorldCom chapter 11 bankruptcy); see also Steve Burkholder, Final Report Says
WorldCom Could Be Target, Can Sue KPMG, Citigroup,Andersen, CORP. L. DAILY, Jan. 28,
2004.
98. See id.
99. See Jonathan Weil, WorldCom Is Told It Must Withhold Pay to KPMG, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22,2004, at C5; Shawn Young & Jonathan Weil, States Move to Oust KPMGAs MCI's
Independent Auditor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2004, at A3.
100. See Cassell Bryan-Low, More Ernst Nonaudit Services Under Fire, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at CI.
101. See Jonathan Weil & Cassell Bryan-Low,Audit FirmsOverbilledClientsforTravel,
Arkansas Suit Alleges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,2003, atAl; Jonathan Weil & Cassell Bryan-Low,
Arkansas Rulings May Hurt Reputation ofPricewaterhouse,WALL ST. J., Sept. 18,2003, at Cl.
102. See Jonathan Weil & Cassell Bryan-Low, Travel-BillingProbeHasBigger Scope,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at CI.
103. See Jonathan Weil, PricewaterhouseSettles Billing Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
2003, at A3; see also Jonathan Weil, DisputedDiscounts: Court Files Offer Inside Look at
PricewaterhouseBilling Clash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2004, at Al.
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Ill. THE ROLE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND UNCONSCIOUS BIAS IN
AUDIT FAILURES

A recent Harvard Business Review article entitled "Why Good
Accountants Do Bad Audits" argues that unconsciously biased judgments, or
° rather
as noted earlier, what legal scholars often refer to as cognitive bias,'O
than criminal collusion between auditors and management, often cause audit
failures.'0 5 Two recent experiments, one with business students and the other
with professional auditors, demonstrated that even the suggestion of a
hypothetical relationship with a client distorts an auditor's judgments. As the
audit failure at Enron vividly illustrates, long-standing relationships involving
millions of dollars in ongoing revenues can only magnify the results. The
article posits that three structural aspects of the accounting
industry-ambiguity, attachment, and approval-create significant
opportunities for bias to influence auditing judgments. In addition, the article
highlights three aspects of human nature-familiarity, discounting, and
escalation-that amplify auditors' unconscious biases. 106
A. Ambiguity
Accounting remains an art, not a science, which requires enterprises and
their auditors to exercise professional judgment in preparing and auditing
financial statements. Although we often hear accountants referred to as "bean
counters" and may believe that accounting provides clear-cut answers to all
questions, financial accounting requires various estimates that affect the
amounts shown in the financial statements, including the reported amounts of
assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses. In addition, generally accepted
accounting principles often allow alternative treatments for the same
transaction or events and may not address a particular situation because
business transactions evolve more rapidly than accounting principles. Witness
the Internet's recent emergence and Enron's transformation from a regional
natural gas company to a global energy and commodities trader. 0 7 Given the
various accounting estimates and permissible choices in accounting methods,
a typical business enterprise could potentially select from more than a million

See supra note 20.
See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 102.
See id.
See generally Matthew J. Barrett, Enron, Accounting and Lawyers, NOTRE DAME
LAWYER, Summer 2002, at 14-15, available at http://www.nd.edu/-ndlaw/alumni/
ndlawyerfbarrett.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
104.
105.
106.
107.
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possible "bottom lines."'0 8 To illustrate, the fast-food chain Wendy's once
advertised that its customers could order a hamburger 256 different ways.
Wendy's offered eight different toppings and condiments, such as lettuce,
tomato, cheese, ketchup, and mustard, which customers could request. Either
selecting or omitting those individual extras translated to 256 options, a
number that grew exponentially with each extra. For public companies today,
generally accepted accounting principles allow even more choices. In this
regard, entities must decide when to recognize revenue; estimate sales returns
and allowances, warranty costs, useful lives, and salvage values; select
inventory and depreciation methods; and decide whether or not to expense
stock options. Bias thrives in such an environment.'0 9
B. Attachment
The auditor's business interests in fostering a long-term relationship with
a client's management encourage auditors to render "clean" audit opinions in
an effort to retain any existing engagements and to secure future business.
Auditors that issue anything but an unqualified opinion frequently get
replaced." 0 During the late 1990s, the largest public accounting firms-first
the Big Six and then the Big Five (now the Final Four)-increasingly
provided non-audit services, such as consulting, internal auditing, and tax
advising, often to the very enterprises they audited."' During 2000, Enron
paid $52 million to Andersen-$25 million for auditing services, and an
additional $27 million for non-auditing services," 2 including $3.5 million for
tax work-and ranked as Andersen's second largest client.",3 Perhaps more
significantly, an internal Andersen memo in February 2001 regarding the
retention of Enron as an audit client refers to $100 million a year in potential

108. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 173 (citing R.J. Chambers, Financial
Information andthe SecuritiesMarket, IABACUS 3, 13-16 (1965), reprintedin R.J. CHAMBERS,
ACCOUNTING FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT, 185-88 (1969)).
109. See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 98-99.
110. See id. at 99.
111. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
112. See ENRON CORP.,
SCHEDULE
14A (2001),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/000095012901001669/00009501
29-01-001669.txt (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); see also Barrett, supra note 107, at 16.
113. See The Enron Collapse: Impact on Investors and Financial Markets: Joint
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Emters. and the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigationsof the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 47, 113
(2001) (statement of Joseph F. Berardino, Managing Partner - Chief Executive Officer,
Andersen) [hereinafter Berardino testimony] (detailing non-audit fees that Enron paid to
Andersen in 2001).
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revenues from Enron."" Even if Andersen could absorb the loss of Enron as
a client, individual careers and the Houston office depended upon retaining
the Enron engagement. As the audit partner for the firm's second largest
client, David B. Duncan enjoyed clout not only in the Houston office, but
throughout Andersen."1 5 Indeed, one accountant has accurately described a
6
$50 million client as a "meal ticket" for a forty-two year-old audit partner."
Large professional services or accounting firms typically encourage their
employees, especially those not likely to become partners, to take jobs with
clients or potential clients when they leave the firm. The resulting "revolving
door" between Andersen and Enron only enhanced the financial attachment.
7
From 1989-2001, eighty-six people left Andersen to work for Enron."
Andersen alumni at Enron included Richard A. Causey, its chief accounting
officer and a former Andersen audit manager; Jeff McMahon, Enron's
treasurer; and Sherron Smith Watkins, the vice president who unsuccessfully
8
tried to blow the whistle on Enron's aggressive accounting.' Employees at
9 In the "up or out"
Enron often referred to Andersen as "Enron Prep.""
environment at Andersen, everyone who worked on the Enron account had
subtle incentives to keep both their bosses and the people at Enron happy.
The so-called "integrated audit" that Andersen employed at Enron and
sought to market more widely to other clients also documents attachment.
Under this model, Andersen sought to combine its role as external auditor
with internal auditing, the process whereby an enterprise checks its own
books.'12 Paralleling and sometimes overlapping outside or independent
audits, internal audits seek to ensure that an enterprise follows its procedures,
safeguards its assets, and operates efficiently. 2 ' Under a five-year, $18
million contract that sought to create an "integrated audit," Andersen took

114.

See Tom Hamburger & Ken Brown, Andersen Knew of Enron Woes a Year Ago,

WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at A3.

115. See Flynn McRoberts et al., A FinalAccounting: Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen,
CHI. TRB., Sept. 3, 2002, at I.
116. See Dellinger, supra note *, at 155 n.2.
117. See Peter Behr& April Witt, ConcernsGrowAmid Conflicts, WASH. POST, July 30,
2002, at Al.
118. See ENRON AND BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES 156 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammon eds., 2002)
[hereinafter ENRON AND BEYOND]; John R. Wilke et al., U.S. Will Argue Andersen Knew of
Missteps, WALL. ST. J., May 7, 2002, at Cl; Alexei Barrionuevo & Jonathan Weil, Duncan
Knew Enron Papers Would Be Lost, WALL. ST. J., May 14, 2002, at Cl.
119. See Behr& Witt, supra note 117.
120. See Alexei Barrionuevo & Jonathan Weil, Partner Warned Arthur Andersen on
EnronAudit, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2002, at C 1; Barrionuevo &Weil, supra note 118 ("Andersen
held out Enron as the prime example of its 'integrated' audit approach.").
121. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 202-04.
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over Enron's internal auditing in 1994, transforming dozens of Enron staffers
into Andersen employees.' 2 2 The Wall Street Journalreported that before
Enron's collapse, more than 100 Andersen employees worked in leased space
inside Enron's headquarters in Houston.' 23 In videotapes that Andersen filmed
to market the "integrated audit," people at both Andersen and Enron described
how intertwined their operations had become. In one segment, Jeffrey
Skilling, then Enron' s president, commented: "I think over time we and Arthur
Andersen will probably mesh our systems and processes even more so that
they are more seamless between the two organizations."' 2 4 Coupled with the
inherent ambiguity in financial statements, such attachment can influence
auditors to accept the "client's" interpretation and application of generally
accepted accounting principles.'2 5
C. Approval
Management has historically selected the accounting principles and
estimates that an enterprise uses to prepare its financial statements.'26 An
audit essentially endorses or rejects the accounting choices that the client's
management has made.'27 Research has shown that self-serving biases become
even stronger when people are endorsing someone else's judgments, provided
thosejudgments align with their own biases, than when they are asked to make
original judgments themselves.' 28 This research suggests that unconscious
bias can cause auditors to accept more aggressive accounting treatments than
the auditor might propose independently.'2 9
D. Familiarity
People are less willing to harm individuals they know relative to
strangers they have never met. People are even less willing to harm paying
clients, or individuals they consider paying clients, with whom they enjoy
ongoing relationships. 3 Like lawyers for corporations, those who represent
122. See McRoberts et al., supranote 115; Alexei Barrionuevo, CourtDocuments Show
Andersen's Ties with Enron Were Growing in Early '90s, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002, at A6.
123. See lanthe Jeanne Dugan et al., On Camera,People at Andersen, Enron Tell How
Close They Were, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at Al.
124. Id.
125. See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 99-100.
126. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 173.
127. See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 99-100.
128. See id. at 99.
129. Seeid. at 99-100.
130. See id. at 100.
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the entity and not the officer who hired them, auditors' real responsibilities
flow to the investing public, not the manager or individual who retained
them."'3 An auditor who suspects errors or misstatements, whether intentional
or not, must choose, perhaps unconsciously, between harming a known
individual and likely the auditor's own self-interest by questioning the
accounting, or injuring faceless others by failing to object to the possibly
incorrect numbers. Such biases only grow stronger as personal relationships
with the client's management, sometimes former auditing colleagues,
deepen. 32 David Duncan and Rick Causey often vacationed together,
annually leading a group of Andersen and Enron "co-workers" on golfing trips
33
The "revolving door" between
to elite courses around the country.'
model also strengthened the
audit"
"integrated
the
and
Enron
and
Andersen
3 4 Such familiarity, and the accompanying trust which often
familiarity.'
arises, can erode an auditor's objectivity and neutrality, thereby increasing the
chances that the auditor will believe an untrue assertion from the client's
management.'3 5
E. Discounting
Immediate consequences influence behavior more than delayed ones,
especially when uncertainty accompanies the future costs. This tendency
appeals to the propensity to place more emphasis on the short-term effect of
Immediate adverse
decisions than their long-term ramifications.
the client and its
with
relationships
the
to
damage
including
consequences,
unemployment,
potential
and
management, possible loss of the engagement,
may dissuade auditors from issuing anything other than an unqualified
opinion. By comparison, the costs arising from an audit failure, namely civil
lawsuits, disciplinary proceedings, and reputational losses, appear distant and
uncertain, or even unlikely.'3 6 After an earlier audit failure at Waste
Management, for which Andersen agreed to the largest fine ever against an
auditor, the firm did not fire the audit partners whom the SEC sanctioned."'
Ironically, one of those auditors wrote the document retention policy featured
in Andersen's criminal trial for obstructing justice in the Enron

131. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 182-83.
132. See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 100.
133. See McRoberts et al., supra note 115.
134. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
135. See Bazerman et al., supra note 19, at 100.
136. See id.
137. Flynn McRoberts et al., A FinalAccounting: Civil War SplitsAndersen, Ci. TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 2002, at 1.
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investigation. 3 ' The internal Andersen memo regarding the decision to retain
Enron as a client documents Enron's aggressive accounting practices and
potential conflicts of interest by then-Enron chief financial officer Andrew
Fastow. 39 Nevertheless, Andersen executives decided to retain Enron as a
client because the auditing firm "had the appropriate people and processes in
place to serve Enron and manage [the firm's] engagement risks.' 40 As total
audit and other fees from Enron grew to $52 million in 2000, Andersen
willingly assumed increasing engagement risks for a client that the firm
believed could potentially generate $100 million in revenues annually.' 4 '
F. Escalation
People often hide or explain away minor mistakes, often without
realizing what they are doing. Unconscious biases may cause an auditor to
accept small imperfections in a client's financial statements. 142 Over time,
such misstatements can become material. At that point, correcting the
situation may require admitting previous errors or biases, restating the
financial statements, or even resigning. Rather than take those actions, the
auditor may try to conceal the problem, thereby escalating unconscious bias
into fraud. '4 For example, after Andersen approved the non-consolidated
accounting for various special purpose entities, the auditors later adopted an
interpretation that enabled Enron to avoid recognizing losses for declines in
the value of underlying investments in certain entities known as the Raptors.'44
At Andersen's criminal trial, prosecutors also introduced evidence to show
that the firm's prior audit failures at Waste Management and Sunbeam gave
Andersen a motive to hide the problems at Enron. 45
IV. TAX SERVICES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
To the extent that conflicts of interest cause audit failures, SOx
addresses those problems for publicly traded enterprises subject to the SEC's
jurisdiction with one significant exception: an auditor's potential desire to

138. See id.
139. See Hamburger & Brown, supra note 114.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See Bazerman et al., supranote 19, at 100.
143. See id.
144. See Jonathan Weil, Enron's Auditors DebatedPartnershipLosses, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 3, 2002, at CI.
145. See Barrionuevo & Weil, supra note 120.
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obtain or retain non-audit fees arising from tax engagements might, whether
consciously or unconsciously, influence the auditor's decision to acquiesce in,
or at least not object to, a questionable accounting practice.14 As noted,
Enron paid Andersen $3.5 million for tax services in 2000.147 Even though
management can no longer hire or fire the auditor, management can
potentially use "enhanced independence" as a pretext to support a
recommendation that the audit committee hire another firm to provide tax
services. When an auditor questions a particular accounting treatment or
disclosure that management prefers, management can subtly hint at the
possibility of such a recommendation, which would obviously jeopardize
potentially significant tax or other permissible consulting fees, unless the
auditor accepts the preferred treatment or disclosure. 4 ' Any such scenario
gives management undesirable leverage over the auditor.
Even in a post-SOx world, auditors continue to collect large fees for
providing tax services to audit clients. The Wall Street Journalhas reported
that during 2002, General Electric Co. paid its auditor, KPMG, more than $21
million in tax fees. 49 Offering another example, the same article points out
that Caterpillar Inc. paid its auditor, Pricewaterhouse, $17.4 million for tax
work in 2002,' more than twice the $8.2 million that the company paid in

146. SOx largely misses the mark, however, if unconscious bias explains more than a few
audit failures. As long as financial or other incentives tempt auditing firms and their executives
and employees to try to retain or earn another engagement from the audit client, whether the
future engagement relates to a subsequent audit, an assignment to provide tax services, or the
opportunity to provide other nonprohibited services, unconscious bias can remain present in
audits. Thus, unconscious bias also suggests that mandatory rotation of audit firms, after fixed
terms for predetermined fees, might minimize the threat that a public company can fire or
otherwise punish an auditor for failing to approve questionable accounting practices. See supra
note 21.
147. See Berardino testimony, supra note 113.
148. See generally HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 173-74, 192-93. To some
extent, the SEC's new rules against improper influence on the conduct of an audit deter such
behavior. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the intent
requirement, however minimal, renders those new rules unlikely to prevent misbehavior. At
least as to the words "coerce, manipulate, or mislead," the SEC's rules seek to impose a
negligence standard. See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, supra note 87, at 31,823.
By using "knew or should have known," which the SEC admits has historically indicated a
negligence standard, see id. at 31,826, the rule arguably ignores the clause "for the purpose of
rendering such financial statements materially misleading" in SOx section 303(a). See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7242). Devious and very careful or zealously represented management may well
circumvent these rules.
149. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Keeping the Accountantsfrom Flying High, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 2003, at C1.
150. See id.
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audit fees."' The amount for tax work included $13.9 million "'for services
performed as a subcontractor for outside legal counsel."'" 2 For 2003, a
spokeswoman at Caterpillar estimated that the amount for tax work would fall
to $13.5 million.'5 3 During Hewlett-Packard Co.'s 2003 fiscal year, its
auditor, Ernst & Young, provided $20.6 million in tax services. 5 4 As
additional examples, Coca-Cola Co. and Citigroup Inc. paid their auditors
$9.9 million and $8.5 million in tax fees, respectively, during 2003.' Given
this potential conflict of interest, the following section will discuss some
arguments why auditors for public companies should not offer various tax
services.
A. Arguments Why Auditors for Public Companies Should Not Offer Various
Tax Services to Audit Clients
To try to eliminate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when an
auditor seeks to obtain or retain tax engagements with an audit client and to
embrace more fully the three basic principles regarding auditor independence
that Congress affirmed in SOx, 15 6 this article endorses the recommendation
that auditors for public companies should focus exclusively on auditing. 7
Under that recommendation, registered public accounting firms should neither
render any tax services to publicly traded audit clients or their executives nor
promote tax shelters to anyone. 118
Auditors have historically provided various tax services to audit clients,
ranging from preparing tax returns, representing clients in tax audits and
claims for refunds, advising clients how to structure regular business
transactions to minimize taxes, and, more recently, recommending

151. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting FirmsEarn Morefrom Consulting,WALL ST.
J., Apr. 16, 2003, at C9.
152. Id. (quoting regulatory filings of Caterpillar Inc.).
153. See Bryan-Low, supranote 149.
154. See David Bank, CalpersWon't Back 5 Directorsof H-P in Protestover Auditing,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A2.
155. See Alison Carpenter& Joyce E. Cutler, CaIPERS Continues to Draw Bright Line
Looking at Auditor, DirectorIndependence, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA), Apr. 20, 2004.
156. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
157. See Wolfman, Stick to Your Auditing, supra note 16.
158. See, e.g., Wolfman, The Best Way, supra note 16 (arguing that any tax advice that
an auditor provides to any client may impair the auditor's independence).
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transactions solely to reduce taxes. 5 9 Adopting the rather arbitrary labels that
the SEC used in the final regulations on auditor independence, this discussion
divides "tax services" into three broad categories: "tax compliance," "tax
planning and advice," and "tax shelters."'' 61 Within compliance work, an
auditor might prepare tax returns, amended returns, or claims for refund, or
provide tax payment-planning services. 16 ' The "planning and advice" category
encompasses requests for private letter rulings or technical advice, merger and
62
acquisition planning, employee benefit plans, and tax audits and appeals.
Under the category "tax shelter," the auditor might develop, market, or
promote so-called "tax products," "tax minimization strategies," or "taxmotivated transactions," all ofwhich "might satisfy the technical requirements
of the tax statutes and administrative rules, but that serve little or no purpose
other than to generate income tax or financial statements benefits.' ' 63 These
tax products often allow "value-added" billing or generate fees based on a
percentage of the taxes saved."6 Although various tax services present
potential conflicts of interest in differing degrees, drawing lines between
different types of tax services, such as tax compliance, tax planning and
consulting, and tax shelters, presents very significant practical difficulties.
Equally important remains the fact that even tax services that appear routine
may impair auditor independence. Given the conflicts of interest and
definitional problems, this part recommends that auditors for public
companies neither provide tax services to audit clients or their executives nor
promote tax shelters.

159. Auditors originally examined the financial statements in an effort to provide
assurance that those statements fairly presented the enterprise's financial condition and
operating results. Given the connections between income for financial accounting purposes,
usually referred to as "book income," and taxable income, accounting firms soon began
preparing, or helping to prepare, tax returns for their audit clients. As accounting firms became
proficient in tax matters, they began advising existing clients, and then potential clients, about
ways to save taxes. Prior to SOx, one industry observer commented that "accounting firms sell
tax products the same way 'Amazon.com sells books."' Stratton, supra note 7.
160. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6031. The Final Rules borrowed language from The
Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise to describe "tax shelters"
as "'novel and debatable tax strategies and products' . . . the sole business purpose of which may
be tax avoidance and the tax treatment of which may be not supported in the Internal Revenue
Code and related regulations." Id. at 6017 & n. 112.
161. See id. at 6031. This category may encompass more than so-called traditional tax
preparation services, which arguably includes only tax return preparation and, perhaps, tax
refund claims arising from another tax audit.
162. See id.
163. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 92, at 17.
164. See Stratton, supra note 7.
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1. The Inherent Conflicts ofInterest
In an effort to illustrate the inherent conflicts of interest that can arise
when auditors provide various tax services, this section separately discusses
the three different types of tax services that the SEC's final rules address: tax
compliance services, tax planning and consulting, and "tax shelters." From
the outset, we should acknowledge the significant difficulty in distinguishing
between those three categories of tax services. Do tax compliance services
include representing a client in any administrative proceeding that may arise
when a governmental body audits a tax return that the auditor may have
prepared? Is preparing an amended tax return always compliance-related? At
exactly what point does conventional tax planning begin and end? Because
the SEC has cautioned audit committees about "tax shelters," this part begins
with those services, and then proceeds to discuss tax planning and consulting
services.
Recall that the basic principles underlying the auditor independence
rules in SOx generally dictate that (1) an auditor cannot function as part of
management; (2) an auditor cannot audit his or her own work; and (3) an
auditor cannot serve as an advocate for the client.'6 5 Although many
commentators view tax compliance services as perfectly acceptable for
auditors to provide to audit clients, this part suggests that, in the context of a
public company, applying those basic principles demonstrates that inherent
conflicts of interest even flow from compliance services. As a result, auditors
should neither provide tax services, whether preparation, planning, or
minimization services, to publicly traded audit clients and their executives nor
promote any tax shelters.
a. Tax Shelters
Keep in mind that although the SEC did not use the label "tax shelters"
to describe certain tax services that the business community refers to as "tax
products," "tax minimization strategies,"or "tax-motivated transactions," the
SEC's release accompanying its final rules on auditor independence did
encourage audit committees to "scrutinize carefully" any engagement in which
the auditor initially recommends a transaction where "the sole business
purpose of which may be tax avoidance and the tax treatment of which may
be not supported in the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations."' 6 6 In
discussing tax shelters, also recall that the SEC's rules do not apply to non-

165.
166.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
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audit services that an auditing firm provides to a non-audit client.'6 7 In other
words, the SEC rules do not prohibit registered public accounting firms from
offering tax services to non-audit clients.
At the most fundamental level, designing and marketing tax shelters that
exploit existing "loopholes" in tax laws usually involve advocacy and
partiality, rather than the independence that best protects the investing
public.168 Only a truly independent auditor can provide adequate assurance to
the appropriateness of an enterprise's tax reserves
the investing public about
69
and related disclosures.
In addition, when a registered public accounting firm promotes a tax
shelter to an audit client, the auditor often must audit its own advice. In an
audit, the auditor evaluates the various representations that an enterprise's
management asserts in the financial statements and related notes about the
firm's assets and liabilities at a specific date and transactions during a
particular accounting period so that the auditor can render a report on, and
almost always express an opinion about, those financial statements and
accompanying disclosures. 70 Ultimately, the auditor seeks to express an
opinion as to whether the financial statements and related disclosures present
fairly, in all material respects, the enterprise's financial condition, results of
operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.' 7 '
When auditors review the items for accrued taxes payable on the balance
sheet and income tax expense on the income statement, they must come to
conclusions about the validity of these amounts before they can express an
opinion as to whether the financial statements fairly present the enterprise's
financial condition and operating results in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. 72 As a result, auditors must examine the
enterprise's tax returns and assess the so-called "tax reserves" or "tax

167. See id.
168. See Stratton, supra note 7.
169. See Matthew J. Barrett, Opportunitiesfor Obtainingand UsingLitigationReserves
and Disclosures,63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017 (2002) (discussing litigation reserves and disclosures
generally).
170. See generally HERWITZ & BARRETT,supra note 6, at 180-82, 200-04, 215-17,
233-40. In rare situations, the auditor must disclaim any opinion when the circumstances have
prevented the auditor from performing an examination sufficient in scope to enable the auditor
to form an opinion on the financial statements. See id. at 239-40.
171. See generally id. at 216-17, 233-36.
172. See Stratton, supra note 7. Auditors must perform these procedures whether other
professionals within the firm prepared the tax returns or offered any tax advice, whether the
audit client prepared the returns itself, or whether another law or accounting firm prepared the
return or offered any tax advice. See id.

Summer]

"Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse

491

provisions"'' 3 to evaluate income tax expense for the current period and to
determine whether any material unrecorded or undisclosed tax liabilities exist.
For this reason, all auditing firms need tax expertise to assess both the
enterprise's tax reporting positions and any necessary tax reserves or
provisions. 74
Because income taxes can amount to approximately one-half of a public
company's net income, 75
' an auditor would almost always consider the amount
76
for any period's income tax expense as material to the financial statements.
In addition, an unrecorded or undisclosed tax liability could preclude the
financial statements from fairly presenting the enterprise's financial condition,
results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted
77
accounting principles in all material respects.
In most tax shelters, the promoter either issues a tax opinion or secures
an opinion from another tax professional that the promoter, at least implicitly,
believes supports the desired tax treatment. Anytime an auditor sells a tax
shelter to an audit client that materially affects the client's income tax expense
or liabilities for income taxes payable (a "material tax shelter"), the auditing
firm must review that opinion, whether actually rendered or implicitly
endorsed, while determining if the client has established adequate tax
reserves. As a result, selling or promoting a material tax shelter to an audit
client forces the auditor to audit its own advice. Any tax shelter directly
affects items on the financial statements, such as income taxes payable,

173. Accountants use the terms "reserve" and "provision" to refer to anticipated
liabilities when uncertainty exists about the existence, amount, or timing of the underlying
obligation. Accordingly, "tax reserves" or "tax provisions" refer to amounts believed necessary
to satisfy unpaid tax liabilities, whether or not the taxing authority has begun efforts to collect
the tax. See Barrett, supra note 169, at 1019 n.4.
174. See Stratton, supra note 7.
175. Section II of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, imposes a thirty-five
percent effective tax rate on the most profitable corporations. See I.R.C. § II (b)(1)(D) (2000).
In addition, these corporations often must also pay various foreign, state, and local income
taxes. A thirty-five percent tax rate would leave sixty-five cents in after-tax income for each
dollar of income before taxes. In his most recent letter to the shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc.,Warren Buffet, however, observed that "Today, many large corporations... pay
nothing close to the stated federal tax rate of 35%." Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman
of the Board, to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 7 (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20031tr.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004).
176. As a general rule, auditors usually consider any item that exceeds ten percent of
income before taxes as material. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 6, at 228 (citing LuAnn
Bean & Deborah W. Thomas, The Development of the JudicialDefinition of Materiality, 17
ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 113 (1990)).
177. See, e.g., Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. I11. 1994) (class action arising
from alleged failure to disclose material facts regarding contingent tax deficiencies).
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income tax expense, net income, and earnings per share. When an auditing
firm that has promoted a material tax shelter to the audit client examines the
tax reserves, both cognitive bias and common sense suggest that the members
of the audit team will act less skeptically than an auditor unaffiliated with
anyone who has promoted the tax shelter."'8 Moreover, if the tax practice
group in a registered public accounting firm has recommended, or wants to
recommend, that an audit client take an aggressive position, whether via a tax
shelter or otherwise, the tax professionals might lobby their audit colleagues
in an effort to preserve favorable financial reporting treatment and to avoid
any disclosure about the possible tax ramifications in the financial statements
79
and related notes. 1
Moreover, if the IRS or another taxing authority questions the reporting
position, the resulting tax audit ("examination") may require the auditing firm
to advocate for the client. 8 ' The release accompanying the SEC's final rules
on auditor independence affirmatively states that "representing an audit client
before a tax court, district court, or federal court of claims" impairs
independence.'' Similarly, representing an audit client during administrative
proceedings arising from a tax audit should also impair auditor independence.
While confidentiality rules would typically prevent the general public from
learning that the auditing firm represented the audit client in such
administrative tax proceedings, the fact remains that those administrative
proceedings would require the auditing firm to advocate for the client. Such
advocacy directly contradicts the basic principles that informed the list of
prohibited activities that Congress established.
A different kind of conflict can arise when the auditor offers a tax shelter
or provides a tax opinion to management. This conflict also requires the
auditor to advocate for management. Recall that Sprint's auditor, Ernst &
Young, provided financial-planning advice to various corporate executives,
recommended tax strategies to the company's two highest ranking executives
so that they could avoid paying taxes on more than $100 million in stock
options, and prepared their tax returns. 8' 2 When the IRS began to audit those

178. See Stratton, supra note 7.
179. Because disclosures in the financial statements or related notes can alert tax
authorities about tax reserves or aggressive tax positions, tax practitioners might lobby auditors
against any accounting treatment or disclosures, whether in the financial statements or in the tax
return itself, that might undercut any strategy designed to reduce taxes. See generally Barrett,
supra note 169; see also Stratton, supra note 7.
180. See Brent Goldwyn, Goelzer Urges Corporationsto Avoid Tax Shelters Marketed
by Their Auditors, CORP. L. DAiLY (BNA), Mar. 26, 2003.
181. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
182. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Rebecca Blumenstein, How Ernst Gave Shelter to Many,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2003, at C1.
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returns, an obvious conflict of interest arose because the examination required
Ernst & Young to advocate for management, while at the same time acting as
a "watchdog of management" for the investing public. 83
' If a public company
believes that it should offer tax services as an executive benefit, the company
should retain someone other than the auditor to provide those services." 4
Because accounting firms tend to sell similar tax-shelters, even the
attempt to sell a tax strategy to a non-audit client can impair independence." 5
Once again, unconscious bias and common sense suggest that the members of
an audit team will find it difficult to question a tax shelter substantially similar
to a tax product that their firm has promoted to non-audit clients." 6 For these
reasons, registered public accounting firms should not promote tax shelters to
anyone.
b. Tax Advice and Planning
Tax advice and planning, whether offered by tax professionals in
registered public accounting firms or elsewhere, can take numerous forms.
Ultimately, any such tax consulting seeks to increase the client's bottom line.
According to the SEC, the "planning and advice" category encompasses
requests for private letter rulings or technical advice, merger and acquisition
planning, employee benefit plans, and tax examinations and appeals. 8 7 The
release accompanying the SEC's final rules on auditor independence,
however, unequivocally stated that "representing an audit client before a tax
court, district court, or federal court of claims"'8 8 would impair independence.
As a result, tax professionals from a registered public accounting firm cannot
lawfully represent a publicly traded audit client in tax litigation.'8 9 Both
before SOx and after the SEC's final rules, an audit client could conceivably
ask someone from its auditing firm to provide expert testimony in such tax

183. Id.
184. See Goldwyn, supra note 180.
185. See Bryan-Low & Blumenstein, supra note 182 (reporting that Pricewaterhouse,
KPMG, and Andersen also widely marketed tax shelters similar to the strategies that Ernst &
Young sold to executives at Sprint Corp.); see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text
(describing how KPMG's new audit engagement at WorldCom requires the auditor to evaluate
a tax strategy that it sold to the company before accepting the audit engagement).
186.
See, e.g., Wolfman, Auditor Independence Rules, supra note 16 (suggesting an
amendment to SOx that would prohibit an auditor from performing non-audit services to
anyone).
187. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6031.
188. Id. at6017.
189. See id.
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litigation. 90 In addition, tax professionals in accounting firms presumably can
monitor Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS, as well as the
equivalent state, local, and foreign bodies, for legislative and administrative
developments and presumably may engage in lobbying efforts on behalf of
audit clients.' 9 '
Similar to engagements involving tax shelters, the activities in the SEC's
category of tax advice and planning sometimes require tax professionals and
their firms to give the client an "opinion" setting forth the expected tax
consequences. At other times, the firm may transmit such advice via a less
formal memorandum, or even orally. In any event, generally accepted
auditing standards require the auditor to evaluate the amounts for accrued
income taxes payable and income tax expense before expressing an opinion
on the financial statements.' 92 Whenever an auditing firm conveys a tax
opinion in a material tax engagement ("material tax engagement") to a public
company, the auditor must review its own work, thereby violating one of the
basic principles that Congress recognized as underlying auditor independence.
Surprisingly, however, the SEC's final rules "do not prohibit an accounting
firm from providing [appraisal or valuation] services for non-financial
reporting (e.g., transfer pricing studies, cost segregation studies, and other taxonly valuations) purposes."' 93 Notably, the resulting transfer prices and tax
valuations affect the amounts that enterprises must pay as income taxes,
record as income tax expense, and reflect in tax reserves on their books.
Consequently, whenever tax professionals in a registered public accounting
firm undertake to provide material tax planning advice to an audit client, the
audit requires the firm to audit its own work.'
By comparison, providing a tax opinion to a third party as a condition to
closing a transaction, such as a merger or acquisition, places the auditor in the
position of advocating on behalf of the audit client.'95 Whenever the auditor
provides a tax opinion to a corporate executive of the audit client, the same

190. See Sheryl Stratton, Outlookfor Tax Services UncertainAfter Sarbanes-Oxley, 97
TAX NOTES 171 (2002). After SOx, the prohibition against auditors providing "expert services"
prevents an auditor from assisting a client's legal representative or advocating on behalf of an
audit client in litigation and regulatory or administrative investigations or proceedings. See
Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6016. For reasons not well explained, however, this prohibition
"does not apply to other permitted non-audit services, such as tax services." Id. at 6016 n.97.
191. See Stratton, supra note 190.
192. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
193. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6012.
194. If the IRS or another governmental body audits the client's tax returns, the tax
opinion puts the auditor in the position of advocating for the audit client, regardless of whether
the auditor signed the tax return.
195. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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conflict of interest described in the previous section on tax shelters arises if
the IRS audits the executive's return. Such a scenario requires the auditor to
advocate for the executive, while at the same time acting as a "watchdog of
management" for the investing public.196
Sometimes a client may ask a tax professional to seek a ruling or
technical advice from the governmental body administering a particular tax or
to submit a claim for refund in any situation where the governmental body
could potentially deny the claim. When a tax professional in a registered
public accounting firm accepts such an engagement from an audit client, the
auditing firm becomes an advocate before the administrative body.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the release accompanying
the SEC's final rules on auditor independence certainly implies that tax
professionals in registered public accounting firms may represent publicly
traded audit clients in tax examinations or administrative proceedings arising
from examinations or contested claims for refund. While such examinations
and administrative proceedings typically require the taxpayer's representative
to respond to factual inquiries and requests for relevant documents and to
supply reconciliations, such matters usually also require the representative to
provide explanations for the taxpayer's position. As such, an audit resembles
an adversarial situation. Unless the client and the tax authority agree to
resolve the matter, the representative usually must respond to any proposed
adjustments or to any issues that the examiner might have raised. During this
process, the representative often prepares a memorandum that supports the
taxpayer's position, participates in meetings and conferences, and negotiates
a resolution of the issues. Such activities require a tax professional in a
registered public accounting firm to serve as an advocate.
Although the SEC' s final regulations on auditor independence seemingly
allow registered public accounting firms to offer tax advice and planning,
including requests for private letter rulings or technical advice, merger and
acquisition planning, employee benefit plans, and tax examinations and
appeals, such activities may require an auditing firm to review its own work
and often demand the auditor to serve as an advocate for the audit client or its
management. As another "bright line" best practice, a registered public
accounting firms should not provide tax planning and advice to publicly traded
audit clients. In an effort to avoid the need to audit its own work, a registered
public accounting firm, at a minimum, should not issue a tax opinion to a
publicly traded audit client in any transaction presenting a tax issue that could
materially affect the client's financial statements. To avoid serving as an
advocate for a publicly traded audit client or its management, a registered

196.

See Bryan-Low & Blumenstein, supra note 182.
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public accounting firm should not: provide an opinion to a third party on
behalf of an audit client; submit a request for a tax ruling, participate in
administrative proceedings arising from examinations or contested claims for
refund, or lobby on behalf of an audit client; or render any tax advice to an
executive of an audit client.
c. Tax Compliance
The SEC construes "tax compliance" as generally involving the
preparation of original and amended tax returns, claims for refund, and tax
payment-planning services."' With the exception of tax payment-planning
services, the other forms of tax compliance work create at least potential
conflicts of interest. Recall that before an auditor can express an opinion as
to whether the financial statements fairly present the enterprise's financial
condition and operating results in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, the auditor must examine, if material, the amounts for
income taxes payable on the balance sheet and income tax expense on the
income statement and come to conclusions about any amounts reported. In
addition, the auditor must determine whether any material unrecorded or
undisclosed tax liabilities exist. Collectively, these tasks require the auditor
to review the enterprise's tax returns. If a registered public accounting firm
has prepared the tax returns for an audit client, these procedures require the
auditing firm to examine its own work.198
Even though the Internal Revenue Code provides considerable detail,
many "gray areas" exist in federal income tax law. Tax return preparers,
especially for public companies, often must explain their work during tax
examinations or other administrative proceedings. As discussed in the
previous section on tax advice and planning, such examinations and the
related administrative proceedings typically require the return preparer to
advocate on the client's behalf.'9 9 Once again, such advocacy directly
contradicts the basic principles that informed the list of prohibited activities

197. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6031.
198. Tax return preparers presumably understand the relative aggressiveness of the
various positions that the return takes. When the same firm audits the financial statements,
common sense suggests that the auditor will accord considerable deference to a colleague's
assessments.
199. See Alison Carpenter, Oversight Board's Goelzer Urges Auditors To Be Cautious
in Providing Tax Services, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 16, 2003 (commenting in the context
of tax shelters).
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established by Congress.20 ° Similarly, amended tax returns and claims for
refund often require the auditor to advocate on behalf of the client.
2. The Integrity ofAuditing
In addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, a restriction on tax services
could help restore, or at least preserve, the auditing profession's integrity,
which has suffered severely following the well-publicized audit failures
involving the recent financial frauds. Given the recent revelations of fraud in
the mutual fund industry and the travel billing scandal involving the largest
accounting firms, this section argues that audit committees, the accounting
profession, the PCAOB, and the SEC should proactively seek to prevent
another crisis in confidence and should try to identify any situation in which
an auditing firm could place its or its employees' interests ahead of the
investing public. Unfortunately, the auditing profession cannot afford another
crisis in public confidence. Recalling the Trojan horse, the auditing
profession has more to lose from a further decline in the public's trust than it
has to gain from the additional fees.20 '
If an auditing firm embraces "total independence" and refuses to provide
any tax services to audit clients or their management and does not promote tax
shelters to anyone, such a strategy may allow the firm to differentiate itself
from other auditing firms and to use "enhanced independence" to compete for
new audit clients. This competition could occur inside or outside the Big Four
accounting firms.
3. The Investing Public'sBest Interests
This article, like SOx, focuses only on public companies. Therefore, we
should ask whether the investing public benefits when the independent auditor
provides any of these previously described tax services to an audit client.
Although any prohibition that limits an auditor's ability to provide tax services
to audit clients will increase overall costs, those additional expenses will
reduce the chances of future audit failures and the enormous losses that the
recent financial frauds have imposed on investors. The Wall Street Journal

200.
201.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter, supra note 199 (quoting PCAOB member Daniel Goelzer).
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estimated the market capitalization losses arising from the recent scandals,
compared to their five-year highs, as follows:

WorldCom Inc.
Qwest Communications International Inc.
Tyco International Ltd.
Enron Corp.

$156.10 billion
$88.10 billion
$76.98 billion
$66 billion

Global Crossing Ltd.
$22.01 billion
Adelphia Communications Corp.
$8.32 billion °2
While the "net harm" to investors in these companies likely falls well below
the amounts based upon the highest market capitalizations during the previous
five years,2"' the general decline in investor confidence seemingly caused even
more extensive losses in the overall capital markets. Although fees for audits,
tax services, or probably both, would increase significantly, the additional
costs seem insignificant relative to the hundreds of billions of dollars in losses

that investors suffered in the recent financial scandals.
In addition, more and more investors increasingly believe that auditors
should do nothing more than audit. The California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS), for example, has repeatedly followed its
policies to withhold votes for corporate directors who serve on audit
committees that allowed the corporation's auditor to provide any non-audit
services, including tax services, and, in some circumstances, to vote against
ratification of those auditors.20 4 By comparison, Institutional Shareholders

202. CorrectionsandAmplifications, WALLST. J., Nov. 4,2003, at A2. By comparison,
a Business Week article in 2000 estimated the losses attributable to auditing failures between
1993 and 2000 as at least $88 billion. See Mike McNamee et al., Accounting Wars, BUS. WK.,
Sept. 25, 2000, at 156.
203. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, OptimalDamagesin Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 622-26 (1985) (suggesting that if securities fraud causes a
company's stock price to rise from a price of, say, $10 to $100 per share, and then to decline
to $1 per share once the broad market learns about the fraud, the social loss does not equal $99
per share because while some particular investors may have lost that much, other investors
actually realized gains or suffered smaller losses).
204. See Carpenter & Cutler, supra note 155 (reporting that CalPERS would withhold
votes for Warren Buffet and the rest of Coca-Cola Co.'s audit committee members because they
authorized engagements that, among other things, resulted in $9.9 million in payments during
2003 to Ernst & Young, the company's outside auditor, for tax services and take similar actions
against the members of the audit committees of Citigroup Inc. ($8.5 million in tax fees in 2003),
Sprint Corp. ($2.3 million in tax fees in 2003), PG&E Corp. ($2.2 million in tax fees in 2003)
and several other companies); Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Calpers Targets Directors
Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at CI (reporting that TIAA-CREF and the
New York State Common Retirement Fund agree with CalPERS position on auditor
independence, but that they have not withheld votes from all audit committee members when
the audit committee has approved non-audit services); Bank, supra note 154 (reporting that
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Services (ISS), a firm that advises institutional investors on proxy voting
issues, focuses on the ratio between fees for audit and related services relative
to fees for other services in determining how to vote on whether to reelect
audit committee members to the board of directors and on auditor ratification
issues. °5 Among other things, ISS requires that fees paid for tax services
beyond compliance not equal or exceed audit and audit-related fees. Audit
committees can insist that a firm other than the company's auditor prepare the
company's tax returns and provide any desired tax planning services.
Investors can vote against audit committee members who approve any nonaudit services, including tax services, by the auditor and against ratification
of those auditors.
B. Arguments Against Additional Prohibitions on Tax Services
Opponents of additional prohibitions on tax services would likely
advance numerous arguments against the recommendations in this article.
First, opponents might argue that accounting firms have historically offered
a wide range of tax services to audit clients,20 6 and that this historical practice
has not presented problems. Although accountants provided tax services to
their audit clients even before Congress first formulated the federal securities
laws in the 1930s, 20 7 the increasingly widespread use of tax shelters, the recent
revelations about the conflicts of interest at Sprint, and the tax shelter
practices at Enron and WorldCom illustrate the very real conflicts that exist
when auditors provide tax services to audit clients and their executives or
promote tax shelters. New times commonly present new temptations, which
often require revisions to out-dated rules.
As mentioned earlier, taxes can amount to approximately one-half of a
public company's net income. 8 Consequently, opponents might next argue
that an auditing firm's tax expertise enhances audit quality and that greater
oversight over tax issues follows when the auditor also prepares the tax

CalPERS withheld its votes for the directors and voted against ratifying Ernst & Young after
the auditor provided $20.6 million in tax services to Hewlett-Packard Co. in fiscal 2003); see
also Sheryl Stratton,AccountingBoard Won 'tDefine Tax Services, but Will Inspect Them, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 16, 2003, availableon LEXIS at 2003 TNT 200-4. Because the SEC's
Final Rules contain various transitional rules that grandfather engagements that existed before
May 8, 2003 for certain nonaudit services performed before May 8, 2004, I would hesitate to
apply any "bright line" tests to any fiscal period beginning before that later date. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01(e)(l) (2003).
205. See Stratton, supra note 204.
206. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
207. See id. at 6017 n.103.
208. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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returns.20 9 Firms less familiar with the client's tax situation may not provide
the highest quality audit services. Under this view, the informational
synergies from a multidisciplinary practice actually improve audit quality.210
Similar to the need for an auditor to understand the design and implementation
of financial information systems, auditors need tax expertise. Any shift in tax
work from registered public accounting firms to law firms or tax consulting
firms could discourage tax professionals from pursing tax careers in registered
public accounting firms, which could adversely affect the talent pool available
to advise during audit engagements. Such a scenario would lead to less
independent review and less transparency for investors.
Third, in the release accompanying the SEC's final rules to enhance
auditor independence, the Commission described tax services as "unique
among non-audit services. ' Inaddition to the long standing practice in
which auditors have provided tax services to audit clients, the SEC pointed to
detailed tax laws and the fact that the federal income tax laws give the IRS
discretion to audit any tax return.21 2 Although the Internal Revenue Code
provides considerable detail, many "gray areas" exist in federal income tax
law, and tax examinations and the related administrative proceedings typically
require the return preparer or the taxpayer's representative to advocate on
behalf of the audit client, an activity which violates that basic principles that
Congress affirmed in codifying the list of impermissible activities that
automatically impair an auditor's independence. 2t 3
Unlike financial
information systems design and implementation, tax services often require the
preparer to serve as advocate for the client upon audit or in administrative
proceedings. As a practical matter, publicly traded companies regularly
undergo tax examinations. Although the audit rate for large corporations has
dropped in recent years, the Internal Revenue Service nevertheless audited

209. See Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
210. See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of
Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1426-36 (2000).
211. Final Rules, supra note 12, at 6017.
212. See id. Indeed, some practitioners have argued that the calculation of a
corporation's taxable income begins with net income for financial accounting purposes. See
Stratton, supra note 7. These practitioners point to the fact that Schedule M-1, Reconciliation
of Income (Loss) per Books With Income (Loss) per Return, in a corporation's federal income
tax return, requires the corporation to reconcile net income or loss for financial accounting
purposes to the income or loss reported on the return. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM
1120, U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN 4, (2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/fl 120.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
213. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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almost one-in-three corporations with $250 million or more in assets-a proxy
for publicly traded companies-during fiscal 2003.214
Both the SEC and the accounting profession have argued that auditors
typically defend an audit client's financial reporting in SEC inquiries and
investigations. To the extent that auditing firms provide factual responses to
inquiries, the practice does not unreasonablyjeopardize auditor independence.
Once an auditing firm offers explanations for the client's financial reporting,
the auditor has begun to advocate for the audit client and, at a minimum, has
impaired the auditor's perceived independence.
Next, separating the audit and tax functions would unquestionably
increase the combined fees that public companies would pay for auditing and
tax services." 5 Admittedly, tax professionals less familiar with a public
company's operations may not provide the most cost effective tax services.
The question becomes whether the benefit from additional independence
exceeds the economic waste from the additional fees and potentially lower
quality services.2 16 While adding tax services to the list of prohibited services
will unquestionably increase the total fees that public companies pay for
auditing and tax services, given unconscious bias and the enormous losses and
damage from the Enron scandal and other recent audit failures, can public
companies any longer afford not to pay increased fees for the benefit of their
investors, employees, and communities?
The Big Four accounting firms have developed unique tax expertise and
perspective, especially in the international arena.2" 7 Through their world-wide
affiliations and investments in technology, the Big Four accounting firms can
typically obtain answers to most tax questions in most jurisdictions within
seventy-two hours. Most law firms simply cannot compete in that regard.
Given the need for auditing firms to employ individuals with tax expertise to
examine an audit client's tax returns and tax reserves, economic
considerations and the need to keep audit fees as inexpensive as possible
would suggest that registered public accounting firms could use the time that
their tax experts do not spend on audit matters to perform tax compliance and

214. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, New FindingsAbout the IRS
(Apr. 12,2004), availableat http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/current/ (last visited May 19,
2004) (reporting that the audit rate dropped from 347 per 1,000 returns in fiscal 1999 to 290 per
1,000 returns in fiscal 2003).
215. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 7.
216. In 1979, the Public Oversight Board published a study on the scope of services that
auditing firms provided. The study could not locate any situation where rendering tax services
compromised an auditor's independence. The study concluded that separating tax services from
the audit could produce significant economic waste and might deny clients the best tax advice
reasonably available. See Stratton, supra note 7.
217. See Stratton, supra note 190.

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2004:463

tax planning for non-audit clients. For this reason, this article does not
advocate that auditors for public companies immediately stop rendering all tax
services. Any auditing firm that provides tax services to non-audit clients,
however, should exercise great care to ensure that the firm's "tax culture"
does approach or surpass the firm's "audit culture."2 '
Finally, opponents will likely portray any ban on tax services to audit
clients as a "one-size fits all" prohibition. Keep in mind, however, that such
a prohibition would apply only to public companies in an effort to protect
investors. In a perfect world, competition on independence issues might start
a "race to the top." Given recent history and various financial incentives, a
"race to the bottom" seems more likely to emerge. In essence, prohibiting
registered public accounting firms from providing tax services to audit clients
and their executives, and from promoting tax shelters to any taxpayer,
represents nothing more than a minimum standard necessary to protect
investors.
Fundamentally, the most significant problems arise when auditors must
review their own work. In my perfect world, auditors would provide only
audit services to audit clients.2t9 Tax consulting firms, likely employing
accountants, lawyers, or both, would offer tax services to public companies
and their executives.22 Registered public company accountants would need
to employ tax experts to help determine whether the client had appropriately
determined tax expense and established adequate tax reserves. 2 A truly
independent audit can only occur when someone other than the preparer
reviews tax returns and assesses the tax reserves.

218. The emergence of a "consulting culture" at Andersen ultimately led to the firm's
demise. See Barrett, supra note *,at 163.
219. Because the world rarely, ifever, attains perfection, however, "acceptable practices"
would allow an auditor to perform tax compliance work and tax planning work unrelated to tax
shelters for non-audit clients. As mentioned earlier, such practices would allow auditing firms
to employ tax experts who could use any time not spent on audit matters to perform tax
compliance and tax planning work for non-audit clients.
220. While the Final Four accounting firms continue to offer certain consulting services,
only Deloitte & Touche has not sold or divested its consulting business. Pricewaterhouse sold
its consulting practice to International Business Machines Corp., KPMG's consulting practice
became BearingPoint, and Ernst & Young sold its consulting practice to Cap Gemini Group
USA. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOUNTING FIRM CONSOLIDATION: SELECTED
LARGE PUBLIC COMPANY VIEWS ON AUDIT FEES, QUALITY, INDEPENDENCE, AND CHOICE, GAO03-1158, at 4 n.5 (2003), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031158.pdf (last visited
Mar. 25, 2004).
221. Over time, the various tax consulting firms would likely develop reputations that
the auditor might rely on, at least to some extent, during its review of the client's financial
statements.
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CONCLUSION

This article has described the potential conflicts of interest that arise
when auditors provide tax services to audit clients or promote tax shelters in
a post-SOx world. In an effort to prevent further damage to the auditing
profession's reputation, the public's confidence in the capital markets in this
country, and the U.S. economy generally, this article urges individual auditors,
auditing firms, the accounting profession, audit committees, and investors to
enhance auditor independence further and to take those actions necessary to
preclude auditors for public companies from providing tax services to audit
clients or promoting tax shelters to anyone. While various tax services present
potential conflicts of interest in differing degrees, drawing lines between
different types of tax services, such as tax return preparation, tax consulting,
and tax planning, presents very significant practical difficulties. Recognizing
these practical difficulties, this article recommends a "bright line," best
practice that would bar registered public accounting firms from rendering tax
services to audit clients or their executives and promoting tax shelters to
anyone. If an auditing firm embraces such a "total independence" policy, the
firm may gain a competitive advantage in attracting new audit clients. Such
an approach might even allow one or more firms to compete favorably with
the existing Big Four accounting firms, reducing consolidation in the industry.
Alternatively, boards of directors and audit committees may listen to the
advice from large institutional investors and refuse to preapprove various tax
services, especially questionable tax shelters from any public accounting
firm.222 More and more investors increasingly believe that auditors should do
nothing more than audit.
If these groups fail to address the problem in the very near future, the
PCAOB and the SEC should act. PCAOB member Daniel L. Goelzer has
expressed his opinion that the Board will likely not engage in any rulemaking
in the near future. He has added, however, that during its inspections, the

222. See Goldwyn, supra note 180. Policy setters might describe a strategy as
"questionable" if an independent advisor assesses that the IRS would more likely than not
challenge if it knew the underlying facts. The Conference Board has urged directors to avoid
"novel and debatable" transactions. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION ON PUBUC
TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37,42 (2003), available

at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/758.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
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Board could look at whether rendering certain kinds of tax services to audit
clients will raise independence issues.223
Given the challenges in identifying exactly what services go beyond tax
compliance and routine planning, or in distinguishing tax shelters from other
types of services, the PCAOB and the SEC should seriously consider a
complete ban that prohibits registered public accounting firms from providing
any tax services to audit clients and from promoting any tax shelters. While
better solutions, such as encouraging auditing firms to compete for audit
engagements on independence grounds, may eventually emerge, neither the
investing public nor the auditing profession can afford to wait much longer.
SOx's auditor independence provisions have built a Trojan horse that
threatens both the auditing profession and the investing public.

223. See Stratton, supra note 204. For example, if an audit client engaged in a listed
transaction that the Internal Revenue Code and related Treasury Regulations require the client
to disclose to the IRS, the Board's staff could try to determine whether the auditor initiated the
transaction. If so, the Board could try to determine whether the transactions impaired the
auditor's independence. See id.

